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Abstract
We explore the implications of unawareness for tort law. We study cases where injurers
and victims initially are unaware that some acts can yield some consequences, or alternatively that some acts or consequences are even possible, but later become aware.
Following Karni and Vierø (2013) we model unawareness by Reverse Bayesianism. We
compare the two basic liability rules of Anglo-American tort law, negligence and strict
liability, and argue that negligence has an important advantage over strict liability in
a world with unawareness—negligence, through the stipulation of due care standards,
spreads awareness about the updated probability of harm.

Keywords: negligence, Reverse Bayesianism, strict liability, tort law, unawareness.
JEL Codes: D83, K13.

∗

University of Exeter, Department of Economics, S.Chakravarty@exeter.ac.uk.
University of Nottingham, Department of Industrial Economics, David.Kelsey@nottingham.ac.uk.
‡
Georgetown University, Law Center, jct48@georgetown.edu.
†

1

Introduction

Background Expected utility theory (Savage, 1954) posits a space of mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive states of the world, representing all possible resolutions of uncertainty. It assumes that when a person chooses an act, although she is uncertain about the
true state of the world and therefore about the consequences of her chosen act, she nevertheless has complete knowledge of the state space—she knows all the possible acts and all the
possible consequences of each and every act. In reality, of course, people often lack complete
knowledge of the state space. This is known as unawareness. People may be unaware of
some acts, some consequences, or that a known act can yield a known consequence.
Unawareness plays an important role in many economic and legal spheres. A prime
example is that people may write incomplete contracts due to unforeseen contingencies.
Another example is that a person may be unaware that an act can result in criminal liability.
A third example is that a person may not be aware of all the objections that she can raise
to a witness’s testimony in a trial. In this paper we study the implications of unawareness
for tort law, the branch of the common law that governs liability for civil wrongs.
Tort liability rules and unawareness A central question in law and economics is
whether negligence or strict liability is the more efficient tort liability rule. Under negligence
a victim can recover damages for harm caused by an injurer who failed to take reasonable
care. Under strict liability, by contrast, a victim can recover damages for harm caused by
the activity of an injurer irrespective of the injurer’s level of care. The relative efficiency of
the two rules is customarily measured by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
A bedrock result in the economic analysis of tort law is that, in the case of unilateral
accidents with fixed activity levels, negligence and strict liability are equally efficient, provided that, in the case of negligence, the court properly sets the due care standard (the legal
standard for what constitutes reasonable care) (Shavell, 1987).1 This equivalence result,
however, presents something of a puzzle in light of two facts about negligence. First, negligence is the dominant rule in Anglo-American law.2 Second, negligence is the more costly
rule to administer, because the court must determine the due care standard and adjudicate
1

In unilateral accidents, the injurer, but not the victim, can take care to reduce expected harm. If the
activity level is fixed, the injurer affects expected harm only through her level of care (and not through her
level of activity). The equivalence result also holds in the case of bilateral accidents with fixed activity levels,
provided that strict liability is coupled with the defense of contributory negligence.
2
In modern Anglo-American law, strict liability applies only in a handful of accident cases, including
cases involving abnormally dangerous activities or products with manufacturing defects (Dobbs et al., 2011,
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whether it was met. The puzzle is that if negligence and strict liability are equally efficient
but negligence is more costly to administer, why is negligence the dominant rule?
The negligence puzzle has led researchers to revisit the equivalence result by exploring departures from the standard accident model, which is based on the expected utility framework
and the Bayesian paradigm. For instance, Teitelbaum (2007) and Chakravarty and Kelsey
(2017) explore ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty). They assume the relevant parties have
neo-additive preferences and find that this breaks the equivalence in favor of negligence.3
We explore unawareness. We study cases where injurers and victims initially are unaware
that some acts can yield some consequences, or alternatively that some acts or consequences
are even possible, but later become aware. The phenomenon of becoming aware is known as
growing awareness. It is the expansion of the state space when a person discovers a new act,
consequence, or act-consequence link. Examples relevant to tort law include the discovery
of a new product or technology (new act), the discovery of a new disease or injury (new
consequence), or the discovery that a known product can cause a known injury (new link).
We explore the implications of unawareness for tort law, and specifically for the negligence
versus strict liability debate. To model growing awareness, which requires a theory of how
beliefs update as the state space expands, we adopt the Reverse Bayesian approach of Karni
and Vierø (2013). Reverse Bayesianism posits that as a person becomes aware of new
possibilities, she updates her beliefs in a way that preserves the relative likelihoods of events
in the original state space. More specifically, it postulates that (i) in the case of a new act
or consequence, probability mass shifts proportionally away from the events in the original
state space to the new events in the expanded state space, and (ii) in the case of a new
link, null events in the original state space become non-null, and probability mass shifts
proportionally away from the original non-null events to these events.4
We argue that negligence has an important advantage over strict liability in a world with
unawareness. Under either liability rule a tort litigation involving a new act, consequence,
or link makes the world aware of a new possibility of harm. Under negligence, however, the
litigation provides the world with more information. In particular, the court’s stipulation of a
§ 2). Indeed, certain accident cases that were traditionally governed by strict liability are now governed by
negligence, including cases involving products with a design or warning defect (Dobbs et al., 2011, § 450).
3
The neo-additive model was developed by Chateauneuf et al. (2007). Franzoni (2017) models ambiguity
according to the smooth model of Klibanoff et al. (2005). He finds that strict liability dominates negligence
when the injurer has lower degrees of uncertainty aversion than the victim and can formulate more precise
estimates of the probability of harm, but that negligence dominates strict liability when harm is dispersed
over a very large number of victims, irrespective of the parties’ respective degrees of uncertainty aversion.
4
A null event is an event believed to have zero probability.
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new due care standard serves as a knowledge transmission mechanism, revealing information
about the probability of harm. This enables the injurers of the world to take efficient care.
Negligence provides this information to injurers. Under strict liability they would have to
expend additional resources to develop this information on their own.
McApline v. Bercow Our argument can be illustrated by the landmark Twitter defamation case McAlpine v Bercow.5 On November 2, 2012 the BBC broadcast an interview with
a man who alleged that as a boy he was sexually abused by an unnamed senior politician
in the Thatcher government. Two days later Sally Bercow, a journalist, tweeted “Why is
Lord McAlpine trending? *innocent face*.”6 After McAlpine was cleared of suspicion, he
sued Bercow for libel, claiming that her tweet implied he was a pedophile who was guilty of
sexually abusing boys. The court agreed with McAlpine and held Bercow liable. Following
the decision, a legal commentator observed: “The judgment is one of great public interest
and provides a warning to and guidance for people who use social media” (Rozenberg, 2013).
Two features of the McApline case are interesting. First, there was unawareness. Sally
Bercow defamed Lord McAlpine using a new technology, social media, which is an example
of a new act. Second, the court’s decision revealed a potential harm of this new act. Future
users of social media received useful information about acceptable ways to use it.
Structure of the paper Section 2 introduces the accident model—a unilateral accident
model featuring multiple activities with fixed levels—and presents the equivalence result.
Section 3 describes the unawareness model. In Section 4 we present relevant examples of tort
cases involving unawareness. Section 5 compares and contrasts negligence and strict liability
in a world with unawareness. It considers a simple model with two acts, two consequences,
quadratic care costs, and linear expected harm reduction, and separately analyzes the cases
of a new act, a new consequence, and a new link. Section 6 extends the analysis to a more
general model with arbitrary numbers of acts and consequences, convex care costs, and
convex expected harm reduction. In Section 7 we relate our results to the existing literature.
We offer concluding remarks in Section 8. The Appendix collects the proofs of all results.
5

See [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB).
As a prominent journalist and the wife of the Speaker of the House of Commons, Bercow was well
known to the public and had 56,000 followers on Twitter.
6
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The Accident Model

There are two agents: an injurer and a victim. Both are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers. The agents are strangers and not in a contractual relationship. Transaction costs
are sufficiently high to preclude Coasian bargaining.
The injurer has available m ≥ 2 activities, f1 , . . . , fm . Each activity has the potential to
cause harm to the victim. We assume that the activities are independent experiments, akin
to m one-armed bandits. We refer to this assumption below as Act Independence.7
There are n ≥ 2 potential degrees of harm, z1 , . . . , zn , where zj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n.
P
Activity fi causes harm zj with probability πij , where nj=1 πij = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , m.
P
Thus, activity fi ’s expected harm is nj=1 πij zj . In the absence of unawareness, the agents
have correct beliefs about each harm probability πij .
The injurer engages in each available activity. For each activity fi the injurer, but not
the victim, can take care to reduce the expected harm. The injurer chooses a level of care
xi ≥ 0 having cost c(xi ). Being careless is costless, c(0) = 0, and the marginal cost of care is
positive and increasing: c′ (xi ) > 0 and c′′ (xi ) > 0 for all xi . Taking care reduces the activity’s
P
expected harm at a non-increasing rate: hi (xi ) ≡ nj=1 πij zj τ (xi ), where τ (xi ) ∈ (0, 1] for
all xi with τ (0) = 1 and where τ ′ (xi ) < 0 and τ ′′ (xi ) ≥ 0 for all xi . Care reduces expected
harm by decreasing the probability of harm, the magnitude of harm, or both. We assume
that c(·) and τ (·) are known to all parties and are the same for all activities. We make the
latter assumption for simplicity. It is without loss of generality given the former assumption.
If activity fi causes harm, then the victim may be entitled to damages, depending on
the applicable tort liability rule. Under negligence the victim is entitled to damages equal
to the harm if the injurer’s level of care was below the due care standard stipulated by the
court.8 Under strict liability, by contrast, the victim is entitled to damages equal to the
harm irrespective of the injurer’s level of care. We assume the injurer has the ability to pay
any and all damages to which the victim may be entitled.
7

While Act Independence is a reasonable assumption in many settings, there undoubtedly are settings
in which it is not. We explore the implications for our analysis of relaxing Act Independence in Section 5.4.
For a thorough treatment of Reserve Bayesianism and Act Independence, see Chakravarty et al. (2022).
8
Following in the tradition of the tort law and economics literature, we model the due care standard as a
precise stipulation. In reality, the due care standard may be less specific. For a discussion on the specificity
of the due care standard at common law, see Dobbs et al. (2011, § 145).
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The social goal is to minimize the total social costs of the injurer’s activities (the sum of
the costs of care and the expected harms):
m
X

min

x1 ,...,xm ≥0

The solution x
e
′

c (e
xi ) =

−h′i (e
xi ),

=

c(xi ) + hi (xi ).

i=1

(e
x1 , . . . , x
em ) is given implicitly by the first order conditions

i = 1, . . . , m, and is given explicitly by
x
ei = ξ −1

P

n
j=1 πij zj



,

i = 1, . . . , m,

where ξ −1 denotes the inverse of ξ(xi ) ≡ −c′ (xi )/τ ′ (xi ).9 We refer to x
ei as the efficient level
of care for activity fi . It is the level of care at which the marginal cost of care equals the
marginal benefit (the marginal reduction in expected harm).
Under strict liability the injurer’s problem is identical to the social goal. This is because
strict liability forces the injurer to internalize the total social costs of her activities. Hence,
she will take efficient care in each activity. Under negligence the injurer’s problem is
min

x1 ,...,xm ≥0

m
X

c(xi ) + hi (xi )χ(xi < xi ),

i=1

where xi is the due care standard for activity fi and χ(xi < xi ) = 1 if xi < xi , 0 otherwise.
If the court sets xi = x
ei for all i, then the injurer takes efficient care in each activity.
The reason is twofold. First, the injurer will not take more than the efficient level of care,
because she faces no liability if her level of care equals or exceeds the efficient level. Second,
the injurer will not take less than the efficient level of care, because then she faces strictly
liability, which induces her to take efficient care.
The equivalence result follows immediately from the foregoing.
Theorem 2.1 (Equivalence Result) The injurer will take efficient care in each activity
under either negligence or strict liability, provided that, in the case of negligence, the court
sets the due care standard for each activity equal to the efficient level of care for that activity.
9

Note that ξ ′ (xi ) =

c′ (xi )τ ′′ (xi )−τ ′ (xi )c′′ (xi )
[τ ′ (xi )]2

> 0 for all xi ; hence ξ is invertible.
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The Unawareness Model

We model unawareness following Karni and Vierø (2013). The primitives of the model are a
finite set F of feasible acts and a finite set Z of feasible consequences. In our setting the feasible acts are the injurer’s available activities and the feasible consequences are the potential
harms to the victim. States are functions from the set of acts to the set of consequences.
A state assigns a consequence to each act. The set of all possible states, Z F , defines the
conceivable state space. With m acts and n consequences, there are nm conceivable states.
The agents and the court (collectively, the parties) originally conceive the sets of acts
and consequences to be F = {f1 , . . . , fm } and Z = {z1 , . . . , zn }. The conceivable state space
is Z F = {s1 , . . . , snm }, where each state s ∈ Z F is a vector of length m, the ith element of
which, si , is the consequence zj ∈ Z produced by act fi ∈ F in that state of the world.
An act-consequence link, or link, is a causal relationship between an act and a consequence. The conceivable state space admits all conceivable links. However, the parties may
perceive one or more links as infeasible, which brings them to nullify the states that admit
such links. We refer to these as null states and denote them by N ⊂ Z F . Taking only
the non-null states defines the feasible state space, S ≡ Z F \N . When N ̸= ∅, there are
Qm
i=1 (n − νi ) feasible states, where νi denotes the number of nullified links involving act fi .
The parties have common beliefs represented by a probability distribution p on the conceivable state space, Z F . The support set of p is the feasible state space, S. That is, the
parties assign non-zero probability to each non-null state.
The parties may initially fail to conceive one or more acts or consequences or to perceive
as feasible one or more conceivable links. We refer to such failures of conception or perception
as unawareness. However, the parties may later discover a new act or consequence, which
expands both the feasible state space and the conceivable state space, or a new link, which
expands the feasible state space but not the conceivable state space.10 We refer to such
discoveries and expansions as growing awareness.
In the wake of growing awareness, the parties’ beliefs update in a way that preserves the
relative likelihoods of the events in the original feasible state space. In each case of growing
awareness, probability mass shifts proportionally away from the events in the original feasible
state space to the new events in the expanded feasible state space. In the case of a new act or
consequence, the new events in the expanded feasible state space are also new events in the
10

To be clear, by “new” we mean “not previously conceived” in the case of acts and consequences, and
“previously conceived but perceived as infeasible” in the case of links.

6

expanded conceivable state space. In the case of a new link, the new events in the expanded
feasible state space are formerly null events in the original conceivable state space.
Karni and Vierø (2013) refer to this updating as Reverse Bayesianism. Let Sb denote the
expanded feasible state space and pb denote the parties’ updated beliefs. Formally, Reverse
Bayesianism implies: (i) in the case of a new consequence or link, p(s)/p(t) = pb(s)/b
p(t)
for all s, t ∈ S; and (ii) in the case of a new act, p(s)/p(t) = pb(E(s))/b
p(E(t)) for all
s, t ∈ S, where E(s) denotes the event in Sb that corresponds to state s in S; that is,
E(s) ≡ {t ∈ Sb : ti = si , ∀ i ̸= m + 1} (assuming the new act is fm+1 ).
In Chakravarty et al. (2022) we show how strengthening Reverse Bayesianism by assuming
Act Independence pins down pb. We define Act Independence formally below.
Assumption 3.1 (Act Independence) Let Ai (zj ) ⊂ Sb denote the event that act fi yields
consequence zj ; that is, Ai (zj ) ≡ {t ∈ Sb : ti = zj } is the collection of states in which act
fi yields consequence zj . We refer to events of this type as act events, and for each act
event Ai (zj ) we refer to the act fi as the predicate act. Act Independence holds if for every
collection of act events in Sb such that no two act events have the same predicate act, the
act events in the collection are mutually independent.
Act Independence implies additional restrictions on pb. Observe that we can express each
T
state s = (s1 , . . . , sm ) as the intersection of a unique collection of act events: s = i Ai (si ).
We refer to this collection as the constituent act events for state s. Act Independence implies
that the probability of state s equals the product of the probabilities of its constituent act
Q
events: pb(s) = i pb (Ai (si )). Act Independence also implies that for any act event Ai (zj ),
its conditional probability given any collection of other act events equals its unconditional
probability. In other words, Act Independence implies that the probability that act fi yields
consequence zj is independent of the outcomes of any and all other acts fl , i ̸= l.

4

Growing Awareness: Legal Cases

Instances of growing awareness that are relevant to tort law include the discovery of a new
and potentially harmful product or technology (new act), the discovery of a new disease or
injury (new consequence), or the discovery that a known product can cause a known injury
in a previously unknown way (new link). We list below a few illustrative examples.

7

4.1

New Acts

Social media McApline v. Bercow, which we discuss above in the Introduction, is an
example of a tort case involving a new act—the use of social media (specifically, Twitter).
Fracking Modern day hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” was developed by George Mitchell
in the late 1990s, though its origins can be traced to the 1860s (Gold, 2014). In Ely v. Cabot
Oil and Gas Corporation, a Pennsylvania jury found in favor of nine plaintiffs on claims that
the defendant’s fracking activity at two natural gas wells in Susquehanna County in the mid2000s was negligent and caused the plaintiffs’ compensable nuisance injuries by interfering
with and damaging the plaintiffs’ access to water and their enjoyment of their property. The
gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint was that the defendant’s fracking activity negligently
permitted methane to flow into underground aquifers that wound up polluting the plaintiffs’
water wells.11 Less than two years after the jury verdict in 2016, and less than three months
after the case was finally settled in 2017, the defendant and 25 other major oil and gas
companies, under the auspices of the American Petroleum Institute, announced that they
were launching a new program, called the Environmental Partnership, focused on reducing
emissions of methane and other pollutants from the natural gas sector (Henry, 2017).

4.2

New Consequences

HIV/AIDS The first HIV/AIDS cases were reported in the United States in 1981 (U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). In Quintana v. United Blood Services,
a Denver jury held the defendant liable to the plaintiff for negligently supplying her with
HIV contaminated blood in 1983 (Talavera, 1993).12 In the three decades since the case
was filed, U.S. blood banks, through “the use of donor educational material, specific deferral
questions, and advances in HIV donor testing . . . have reduced the risk of HIV transmission
from blood transfusion from about 1 in 2500 units to a current estimated residual risk of
about 1 in 1.47 million transfusions” (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2015, p. 79914).
11
See 2017 WL 1196510 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (denying defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
but granting its motion for a new trial). The case settled before the second trial.
12
The jury also held the defendant liable to the plaintiff’s husband for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and loss of consortium. The case was initially filed in the late 1980s and the final verdict was
rendered in 1992 (Talavera, 1993).
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Mad cow disease Mad cow disease, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), was first discovered in the United Kingdom in 1986 (Collee and Bradley, 1997). In
2008, Ridley Inc., a Winnipeg cattle feed supplier, settled a class action by Canadian cattle
farmers claiming that the defendant negligently supplied them with BSE contaminated feed
in the early 1990s (Dowd, 2008). In a related class action filed in 2005, the plaintiffs accused
the Canadian government of negligently allowing BSE infected cattle to be imported into
Canada in the late 1980s and used for feed ingredients in the early 1990s (Kienlen, 2017). Two
years after the class action was filed, the Canadian government implemented an enhanced
feed ban aimed at preventing the spread of BSE (Stephenson, 2015).13

4.3

New Links

Agent Orange and cancer Agent Orange, a chemical herbicide, was developed in the
1940s and used by the U.S. military as part of its herbicidal warfare program, Operation
Ranch Hand, during the Vietnam War (Schuck, 1987). The first recorded case of cancer
hails from ancient Egypt, and the origin of the word cancer is credited to the ancient Greek
physician Hippocrates (Sudhakar, 2009). In In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,
Vietnam veterans brought a class action against the manufacturers of Agent Orange alleging,
inter alia, that their exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam resulted in a variety of cancers
and other diseases in the veterans and birth defects in their children.14 The class action was
filed in 1979. In 1983, seven months before the parties reached a settlement, Dow Chemical
Company, the lead defendant in the class action, announced that it was permanently discontinuing production of 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, the component of Agent Orange
that was responsible for its toxicity (Holusha, 1983; American Chemical Society, 1985).
American football and CTE The National Football League (NFL) was founded in 1920
(Crepeau, 2014). Chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), a neurodegenerative brain disease found in people with a history of repetitive head injuries, was first reported in boxers in
1928 and in NFL players in 2005 (Lindsley, 2017). In In re National Football League Players
Concussion Injury Litigation, retired NFL players brought a class action against the NFL
alleging that the league had failed to take reasonable actions to protect the players from CTE
13

The class action was ultimately dismissed in 2022, with the court finding that Canada was not negligent
(Briere, 2022).
14
See 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The case was settled for $180 million.
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and other chronic risks of head injuries.15 The action was filed in 2011. Seven months before
the parties reached a settlement in 2013, the NFL announced a new concussion protocol,
which includes guidelines for sideline evaluation and rules on preseason education, baseline
testing, and the establishment of personnel to conduct evaluations (Flynn, 2016).
In each of the foregoing examples the initial lawsuit increased awareness and precaution
undertaken by injurers, which is compatible with our arguments.

5

Illustrative Results

In this section and the next, we compare and contrast negligence and strict liability in a
world with unawareness. Throughout, we assume the parties are fully rational apart from
unawareness. We further assume that when the parties are unaware of an act, consequence,
or link, their beliefs, although incorrect with respect to the absolute likelihoods of events,
are nevertheless correct with respect to the relative likelihoods of non-null events. Without
this assumption, the parties could not have correct beliefs when they become fully aware,
which would be inconsistent with the standard accident model.
In this section we analyze a simple model, which illustrates our main ideas. We extend
the results to a more general model in the next section. In both models, for simplicity, we
maintain the assumption that c(·) and τ (·) are known to all parties and are the same for all
activities. The latter assumption is without loss of generality given the former assumption.
The simple model has two activities, F = {f1 , f2 }; two consequences, Z = {z1 , z2 }, where
z1 = 0 (no harm) and z2 > 0 (positive harm); quadratic care costs, c(xi ) = (xi )2 ; and linear
expected harm reduction, τ (xi ) = (1−xi ).16 The conceivable state space, Z F , comprises four
states: s1 = (0, 0), s2 = (0, z2 ), s3 = (z2 , 0), and s4 = (z2 , z2 ). Let pk ≡ p(sk ), k = 1, . . . , 4,
denote the parties’ common beliefs on Z F .

5.1

New Link

We start with the case of a new link. We assume the parties initially perceive activity f1 as
safe (i.e., incapable of causing harm) and activity f2 as risky (i.e., capable of causing harm).
That is, we assume they initially perceive the event A1 (z2 ) = {s3 , s4 } as infeasible (null).
15
16

See 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016). The case was settled for approximately $1 billion.
To preserve the condition τ (xi ) > 0 for all xi , we assume xi ∈ [0, 1) in this section.
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This implies p3 = p4 = 0. We can depict the original feasible state space, S ⊂ Z F , as follows:
p

p1

p2

F \S

s1

s2

f1

0

0

f2

0

z2 .

Given S and p, the efficient levels of care are x
e1 = 0 and x
e2 =

p 2 z2
.
2

Under negligence, the

court stipulates x1 = x
e1 and x2 = x
e2 as the due care standards for f1 and f2 , respectively.
Suppose the parties discover that activity f1 is risky. In particular, suppose that the
injurer engages in f1 , that it results in harm z2 , and that the victim brings a tort suit
against the injurer. The feasible state space expands from two to four states to reflect the
discovery that f1 can yield z2 ,17 and the parties update their beliefs to pb:
pb

pb1

pb2

pb3

pb4

F \Sb

s1

s2

s3

s4

f1

0

0

z2

z2

f2

0

z2

0

z2 .

We assume that, by virtue of the suit, the parties learn that activity f1 yields harm z2
with probability δ > 0. The fact is the parties have the incentive to expend resources to
develop this knowledge. As the Hand formula makes plain,18 the probability of harm is an
17

The feasible state space now coincides with the conceivable state space, i.e., Sb = Z F .
The Hand formula is a famous passage from the negligence case, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The case concerned the sinking of the barge Anna C, which took place on
January 4, 1944 in New York Harbor. On the day of the accident, the tugboat Carroll, which was operating
in New York Harbor, unintentionally caused several other barges to break free from their moorings, which
resulted in the sinking of the Anna C. The United States, lessee of the Anna C, sued Carroll Towing Co.,
owner of the Carroll, claiming negligence. The author of the court’s opinion, Judge Learned Hand, proposed
a formula to determine if the standard of care had been met (p. 173):
18

Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does,
she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to
provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she
will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B > PL.
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essential component of a negligence case. Even in a strict liability case, the probability of
harm is relevant to the issues of foreseeability and proximate cause.19
Note that δ = pb(A1 (z2 )) = pb3 + pb4 is the total probability of the new states in the
expanded feasible state space. It is a measure of the likelihood of the act event of which the
parties were previously unaware. Thus, we interpret δ as the degree of unawareness.
Reverse Bayesianism implies that the relative likelihood of states s1 and s2 remains the
same after updating, hence
p1
pb1
= .
p2
pb2
Note that p1 +p2 = 1. Because pb1 +b
p2 = 1−δ, it follows that pb1 = (1−δ)p1 and pb2 = (1−δ)p2 .
Act Independence implies that the odds that activity f2 results in harm is the same whether
or not activity f1 results in harm, hence
pb1
pb3
= .
pb2
pb4
Because pb3 + pb4 = δ, it follows that pb3 = δp1 and pb4 = δp2 . Thus, Reverse Bayesianism (and
knowledge of δ) pins down pb. The following proposition recaps the foregoing results.
Proposition 5.1 Assume there are two acts and two consequences. Suppose the parties
discover a new link between an act and a consequence and learn that the corresponding new
act event has probability δ. Under Reverse Bayesianism and Act Independence, the updated
probabilities are pb1 = (1 − δ)p1 , pb2 = (1 − δ)p2 , pb3 = δp1 , and pb4 = δp2 .
Remark 5.1 Note that p is the Bayesian update of pb conditional on the event S = {s1 , s2 }
(i.e., the original feasible state space). Hence the term Reverse Bayesianism.
Given Sb and pb, the efficient levels of care are
δz2
(b
p3 + pb4 ) z2
b
=
x
e1 =
2
2

(b
p2 + pb4 )z2
p2 z2
b
and x
e2 =
=
.
2
2

b
b
Note that x
e1 > x
e1 but x
e2 = x
e2 . Thus, the discovery that activity f1 is risky necessitates the
stipulation of a new due care standard for f1 but not for f2 .
b
b1 = x
Under negligence, the court stipulates x
e1 as the new due care standard for f1 and
holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z2 to the victim.20 This makes outsiders aware
19

Alternatively, we could assume the court learns δ by virtue of a sequence of suits (cf. Ott and Schäfer,
1997; Feess and Wohlschlegel, 2006).
20
Recall that x1 = x
e1 = 0 before the parties discover that f1 is potentially harmful. Under negligence,
therefore, the injurer will have exercised no care in conjunction with f1 . However, even if the court does
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b
b1 ; specifically, δ = 2x
that f1 is risky. Moreover, they can deduce δ from x
e1 /z2 . As a result,
they can learn pb and b
h1 (x1 ) = δz2 τ (x1 ), without expending additional resources to learn
about δ. This is the information other injurers need in order to take efficient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z2 to
the victim. This makes outsiders aware that f1 is risky. However, they cannot deduce δ or
learn pb or b
h1 (x1 ). Hence, other injurers lack sufficient information to take efficient care.
Remark 5.2 If c(·) and τ (·) are the same for all injurers, then knowledge of b
h1 (x1 ) is not
strictly necessary for them to take efficient care under negligence. They can just blindly
b1 as their level of care, without bothering to deduce δ from x
b1 and learn b
adopt x
h1 (x1 ). If,
b1 in
however, either c(·) or τ (·) varies across injurers, then they need to deduce δ from x
order to learn their own b
h1 (x1 ), which is necessary for them to take efficient care. Moreover,
injurers always need to know b
h1 (x1 ) in order to take efficient care under strict liability,
because the court does not stipulate a due care standard in this case.

5.2

New Act

We next consider the case of a new act. Assume the original feasible state space coincides
with the conceivable state space (i.e., S = Z F ):
p

p1

p2

p3

p4

F \S

s1

s2

s3

s4

f1

0

0

z2

z2

f2

0

z2

0

z2 .

The efficient levels of care are x
e1 =

(p3 +p4 )z2
2

and x
e2 =

(p2 +p4 )z2
.
2

Under negligence, the court

stipulates x1 = x
e1 and x2 = x
e2 as the due care standards for f1 and f2 , respectively.
Suppose the parties discover a new activity, f3 , which has the potential to cause harm.
In particular, suppose that the injurer discovers and engages in f3 , that it results in z2 , and
that the victim brings a tort suit against the injurer before the court. The feasible state
not hold the injurer liable and award damages (perhaps by recognizing a civil ex post facto doctrine which
prohibits retroactive application of a due care standard in a negligence suit), our results below would not
change, because the world already knows the set of potential harms.
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space expands from four to eight states:
pb

pb1

pb2

pb3

pb4

pb5

pb6

pb7

pb8

F \Sb

s1

s2

s3

s4

s5

s6

s7

s8

f1

0

0

z2

z2

0

0

z2

z2

f2

0

z2

0

z2

0

z2

0

z2

f3

0

0

0

0

z2

z2

z2

z2 .

The expanded feasible state space contains two copies of the original feasible state space, one
in which f3 results in no harm and one in which f3 results in harm z2 . Stated differently, the
expanded space splits each of the original states into two depending on whether or not f3
yields positive harm. For each original state there is a corresponding event in the expanded
feasible state space. For instance, the event {s1 , s5 } ∈ Sb corresponds to state s1 ∈ S, the
event {s2 , s6 } ∈ Sb corresponds to state s2 ∈ S, and so forth.21
As before, we assume that, by virtue of the suit, the parties learn that activity f3 yields
harm z2 with probability δ > 0. By Reverse Bayesiansim,
pb1
pb2

=

pb5
.
pb6

p1
p2

=

pb1 +b
p5
.
pb2 +b
p6

By Act independence,

Substituting,

By similar reasoning,

pb1 + pbp1bp2b6
pb1
pb5
p1
=
=
= .
p2
pb2 + pb6
pb2
pb6
p2
p3

=

pb2
pb3

=

pb6
pb7

and

p3
p4

=

pb3
pb4

=

pb7
.
pb8

Because p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1,

pb1 + pb2 + pb3 + pb4 = 1 − δ, and pb5 + pb6 + pb7 + pb8 = δ, we have the following result.
Proposition 5.2 Assume there are two acts and two consequences. Suppose the parties
discover a new act, which they link to both consequences, and learn that the corresponding new
act events have probabilities 1 − δ and δ. Under Reverse Bayesiansm and Act Independence,
the updated probabilities are pb1 = (1 − δ)p1 , pb2 = (1 − δ)p2 , pb3 = (1 − δ)p3 , pb4 = (1 − δ)p4 ,
pb5 = δp1 , pb6 = δp2 , pb7 = δp3 , and pb8 = δp4 .
21

b
Note that the conceivable state space also expands from four to eight states, so Sb = Z F .
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Given Sb and pb, the efficient levels of care are
(p3 + p4 )z2
(b
p3 + pb4 + pb7 + pb8 ) z2
b
=
,
x
e1 =
2
2
(b
p2 + pb4 + pb6 + pb8 ) z2
(p2 + p4 )z2
b
x
e2 =
=
,
2
2
δz2
(b
p5 + pb6 + pb7 + pb8 ) z2
b
=
.
and x
e3 =
2
2
b3 , while
Thus, the discovery of f3 necessitates the stipulation of a new due care standard, x
the due care standards for f1 and f2 are unchanged.
b
b3 = x
Under negligence, the court stipulates x
e3 as the due care standard for the new
activity f3 and holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z2 to the victim.22 This makes
b3 ; specifically,
outsiders aware of f3 (and that it is risky). Moreover, they can deduce δ from x
b
δ = 2x
e3 /z2 . As a result, they can learn pb and b
h3 (x3 ) = δz2 τ (x3 ). This is sufficient information
for other injurers to take efficient care.
As before, however, strict liability does not reveal sufficient information to other injurers.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z2 to the
victim. This makes outsiders aware of f3 (and that it is risky), but they cannot deduce δ or
learn pb or b
h3 (x3 ).

5.3

New Consequence

Lastly, we consider the case of a new consequence. As before, we assume S = Z F :
p

p1

p2

p3

p4

F \S

s1

s2

s3

s4

f1

0

0

z2

z2

f2

0

z2

0

z2 .

The efficient levels of care are x
e1 =

(p3 +p4 )z2
2

and x
e2 =

(p2 +p4 )z2
.
2

Under negligence, the court

stipulates x1 = x
e1 and x2 = x
e2 as the due care standards for f1 and f2 , respectively.
Suppose the parties discover a new consequence, z3 > z2 , which they link to f1 and f2 .
In particular, suppose that the injurer engages in f1 and f2 , that each results in harm z3 ,
and that the victim brings a tort suit against the injurer before the court. The feasible state
22

Again, because the world already knows the set of potential harms, our results below would not change
if the court does not hold the injurer liable and award damages.
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space expands from four to nine states:
pb

pb1

pb2

pb3

pb4

pb5

pb6

pb7

pb8

pb9

F \Sb

s1

s2

s3

s4

s5

s6

s7

s8

s9

f1

0

0

z2

z2

z3

z3

0

z2

z3

f2

0

z2

0

z2

0

z2

z3

z3

z3 .

The new state space is characterized by three events, one in which f1 results in no harm, one
in which f1 results in harm z2 , and one in which f1 results in harm z3 . Each event contains
three states, one in which f2 results in no harm, one in which f2 results in harm z2 , and one
in which f2 results in harm z3 .23
We assume that, by virtue of the suit, the parties learn that activity f1 yields z3 with
probability α1 > 0 and that activity f2 yields z3 with probability α2 > 0. (This is analogous
to assuming that the parties learn the probabilities of the new act event(s) in the previous
cases.) As before, the degree of unawareness is the total probability of the new states, i.e.,
T
δ = pb5 + · · · + pb9 . Under Act Independence, 1 − δ = pb(Ac1 (z3 ) Ac2 (z3 )) = (1 − α1 ) (1 − α2 ).24
The ensuing result follows.
Proposition 5.3 Assume there are two acts and two consequences. Suppose the parties discover a new consequence, which they link to both acts, and learn that the corresponding new
act events have probabilities α1 and α2 . Under Reverse Bayesianism and Act Independence,
the updated probabilities are pb1 = (1 − δ)p1 , pb2 = (1 − δ)p2 , pb3 = (1 − δ)p3 , pb4 = (1 − δ)p4 ,
pb5 = α1 (1 − α2 )(p1 + p3 ), pb6 = α1 (1 − α2 )(p2 + p4 ), pb7 = (1 − α1 )α2 (p1 + p2 ),
pb8 = (1 − α1 )α2 (p3 + p4 ), and pb9 = α1 α2 .
Given Sb and pb, the efficient levels of care are
(b
p3 + pb4 + pb8 )z2 + (b
p5 + pb6 + pb9 )z3
(1 − α1 )(p3 + p4 )z2 + α1 z3
b
x
e1 =
=
2
2
(b
p
+
p
b
+
p
b
)z
+
(b
p
+
p
b
+
p
b
)z
(1
−
α
)(p
+
p4 )z2 + α2 z3
2
4
6
2
7
8
9
3
2
2
b
and x
e2 =
=
.
2
2
b
b
Note that x
e1 > x
e1 and x
e2 > x
e2 . Thus, the discovery of z3 necessitates the stipulation of new
due care standards for both f1 and f2 .
23
24

Note that the conceivable state space also expands from four to nine states, so Sb = ZbF .
For the avoidance of doubt, Aci (zj ) denotes the complement of the act event Ai (zj ).
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b
b
b1 = x
b2 = x
Under negligence, the court stipulates x
e1 and x
e2 as the new due care standards
for f1 and f2 , respectively. The court holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z3 to the
victim with respect to each of f1 and f2 . This makes outsiders aware of z3 (and that it is
b1 and x
b2 :
linked to f1 and f2 ).25 Moreover, they can deduce α1 and α2 (and hence δ) from x
α1 =

b
p3 z2 − 2x
e1 + p4 z2
p3 z2 − z3 + p4 z2

and α2 =

b
p2 z2 − 2x
e2 + p4 z2
.
p2 z2 − z3 + p4 z2

As a result, they can learn pb and
b
h1 (x1 ) = [(1 − α1 )(p3 + p4 )z2 + α1 z3 ]τ (x1 ) and b
h2 (x2 ) = [(1 − α2 )(p2 + p4 )z2 + α2 z3 ]τ (x2 ),
without expending additional resources to learn about α1 and α2 . Thus, negligence reveals
sufficient information for other injurers to take efficient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z3 for
each instance of harm. This makes outsiders aware of z3 (and that it is linked to f1 and f2 ).
However, they cannot deduce α1 or α2 or learn pb, b
h1 (x1 ), or b
h2 (x2 ). As before, strict liability
yields insufficient information for other injurers to take efficient care.

5.4

Act Independence

Before turning to the general results, we conclude this section with a few remarks about Act
Independence. In short, we argue that it is a useful simplifying assumption, but that it is
not crucial. Even without Act Independence, negligence would reveal useful information.
Reverse Bayesianism alone is not sufficient to fully determine the updated probability
distribution pb in the wake of growing awareness. To borrow a term from the econometrics literature, Reverse Bayesianism only partially identifies pb. The reason is that Reverse
Bayesianism prescribes how probability mass shifts away from non-null states in the original
state space to the corresponding states or events in the expanded state space, but it does not
dictate how this mass is distributed among the new states. This is where Act Independence
comes in. It determines how the shifted probability mass is apportioned among the new
states. Together, Reverse Bayesianism and Act Independence fully identify pb.
25
Even if the court does not hold the injurer liable and award damages, the victim’s claims make outsiders
aware of z3 (and that it is linked to f1 and f2 ).
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How realistic is Act Independence? The answer depends on the nature of the specific
activities in question. For instance, the risk that fracking for natural gas results in groundwater contamination is likely to be independent of the risk that importing liquefied natural
gas results in a fire or explosion. By contrast, the risk of contracting HIV from sharing
drug injection needles is likely to be correlated with the risk of contracting HIV from having
unprotected sex, as both depend on the prevalence of HIV in the population.
Because there exist activities whose outcomes are not independent, it is useful to investigate the importance of Act Independence for our results. As above, we consider the simple
case of two acts and two consequences.
New link In the case of a new link, Reverse Bayesianism alone implies pb1 = (1 − δ)p1 ,
pb2 = (1 − δ)p2 , and pb3 + pb4 = δ. Importantly, Reverse Bayesianism alone is not sufficient to
separately identify pb3 and pb4 . As it turns out, this does not create an issue with respect to
activity f1 . Recall that, by assumption, the parties learn δ (the probability that f1 yields
z2 ). Because the efficient level of care for f1 is a function of the sum pb3 + pb4 , the court can
stipulate a new due care standard for f1 in terms of δ. This is sufficient to make outsiders
aware that f1 is potentially harmful. Moreover, they can deduce δ from the new due care
standard for f1 and, in turn, learn b
h1 (x1 ) = δz2 τ (x1 ).
Relaxing Act Independence, however, creates ambiguity with respect to the updated risk
of activity f2 . Because the efficient level of care for f2 is a function of the sum pb2 + pb4 ,
without Act Independence (or another assumption that separately identifies pb3 and pb4 ), the
court cannot stipulate a precise new due care standard for f2 . The best the court can do is
specify lower and upper bounds, using the knowledge that pb4 ∈ (0, δ). Given these bounds,
the best outsiders can do is infer bounds on b
h2 (x2 ).
Of course, the ambiguity can be resolved if the parties learn more about pb. For instance,
if the parties learn not only δ but also either pb2 + pb4 (the updated probability that f2 yields
z2 ) or pb4 (the joint probability that f1 and f2 yield z2 ), this is sufficient to separately identify
pb3 and pb4 . With this, the court can stipulate a precise new due care standard for f2 , from
which outsiders can deduce pb2 + pb4 and, in turn, learn b
h2 (x2 ) = (b
p2 + pb4 )z2 τ (x2 ).
New act In the case of a new act, Reverse Bayesianism alone implies pb1 + pb5 = p1 ,
pb2 + pb6 = p2 , pb3 + pb7 = p3 , pb4 + pb8 = p4 , and pb5 + pb6 + pb7 + pb8 = δ.26 Recall that the
26

See the proof of Proposition 5.2 in the Appendix.
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efficient level of care for f1 is a function of the sum pb3 + pb4 + pb7 + pb8 ; the efficient level
of care for f2 is a function of the sum pb2 + pb4 + pb6 + pb8 ; and the efficient level of care for
f3 is a function of the sum pb5 + pb6 + pb7 + pb8 . Hence, even without Act Independence, the
court’s information is sufficiently precise (i) to know that it need not stipulate new due care
standards for activities f1 and f2 and (ii) to stipulate a due care standard for the new activity
f3 . This makes outsiders aware of f3 (and that it is risky). Moreover, they can deduce δ
from the due care standard for f3 and, in turn, learn b
h3 (x3 ) = δz2 τ (x3 ).
New consequence In the case of a new consequence, Reverse Bayesianism alone implies
pb1 = (1 − δ)p1 , pb2 = (1 − δ)p2 , pb3 = (1 − δ)p3 , pb4 = (1 − δ)p4 , and pb5 + · · · + pb9 = δ.27
By assumption, the parties learn pb5 + pb6 + pb9 = α1 (the probability that f1 yields z3 ) and
pb7 + pb8 + pb9 = α2 (the probability that f2 yields z3 ). Assume the parties also learn pb9 (the
joint probability that f1 and f2 yield z3 ), and let pb9 = γ. Note that δ = α1 + α2 − γ.
Recall that the efficient level of care for f1 is a function of α1 and the sum pb3 + pb4 + pb8
(the updated probability that f1 yields z2 ), and the efficient level of care for f2 is a function
of α2 and the sum pb2 + pb4 + pb6 (the updated probability that f2 yields z2 ). Without Act
Independence these sums are only partially identified (because pb6 and pb8 are not separately
identified), creating ambiguity with respect to the updated risks of both activities. As a
result, the court cannot stipulate precise new due care standards for either activity. The
best the court can do is specify lower and upper bounds. Given these bounds, and given that
the victim’s claims make the world aware of z3 (and its links to f1 and f2 ), outsiders can
deduce α1 , α2 , and δ; however, the best they can do is infer bounds on b
h1 (x1 ) and b
h2 (x2 ).
As before, the ambiguity can be resolved if the parties learn more about pb. For instance,
if the parties learn not only δ and γ but also either pb3 + pb4 + pb8 or pb2 + pb4 + pb6 , this is sufficient
to separately identify pb5 , pb6 , pb7 , and pb8 . With this, the court can stipulate precise new due
care standards for f1 and f2 , from which outsiders can learn b
h1 (x2 ) and b
h2 (x2 ).
In summary, without Act Independence, Reverse Bayesianism only partially identifies pb.
This does not create an issue in the case of a new act—the court’s information is sufficiently
precise to stipulate a due care standard for each activity. In the case of a new link or
consequence, however, it creates ambiguity with respect to the updated risk of one or both
activities, leading to imprecise due care standards. In short, we might say that, without Act
Independence, negligence achieves only “boundedly” optimal tort deterrence. That said,
27

See the proof of Proposition 5.3 in the Appendix.
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negligence still has a partial advantage over strict liability. What’s more, the ambiguity in
any case can be resolved if the parties learn more about pb. In other words, the more the
parties learn about the updated probability of harm, the less important is Act Independence.

6

General Model

In this section we extend the examples from the previous section to a more general model
with m acts and n consequences. We also relax the shape restrictions on the care cost and
expected harm reduction functions and assume only that each is convex.
Let F = {f1 , . . . , fm } be the set of activities and Z = {z1 , . . . , zn } be the set of harms,
where 0 ≤ z1 < z2 < · · · < zn . For each activity fi , the cost of taking care xi ≥ 0 is
c(xi ), where c(0) = 0, c′ (xi ) > 0, and c′′ (xi ) > 0 for all xi ≥ 0. Activity fi ’s expected
Pn
harm is hi (xi ) ≡
j=1 πij zj τ (xi ), where (i) πij is the probability that fi causes zj and
(ii) τ (xi ) ∈ (0, 1], τ (0) = 1, τ ′ (xi ) < 0, and τ ′′ (xi ) ≥ 0 for all xi ≥ 0.28
Given F and Z, the conceivable state space is Z F , where each state s ∈ Z F is a vector
of length m, the ith element of which, si , is the harm zj ∈ Z caused by activity fi ∈ F in
that state. The feasible state space is S ≡ Z F \N , where N ⊂ Z F is the set of null states.
Each state in N is induced by a nullified link between an activity fi and a harm zj .
Let p represent the parties’ common beliefs on Z F . The support set of p is S. That is,
p(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S and p(s) = 0 for all s ∈ N .
Given S and p, the efficient levels of care are x
ei = ξ −1

P

n
j=1 πij zj

(i) ξ −1 denotes the inverse of ξ(xi ) ≡ −c′ (xi )/τ ′ (xi ) and (ii) πij



, i = 1, . . . , m, where
P
=
p(s). Under
s∈S:si =zj

negligence, the court stipulates xi = x
ei as the due care standard for each activity fi .

6.1

New Link

Assume S ⊂ Z F . Suppose the parties discover a new link from fl to zk for some l ∈ {1, . . . , m}
and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let Sb denote the expanded feasible state space and pb denote the parties’
b Observe that Sb = S ∪ ∆, where ∆ = Al (zk ) is the newly discovered
updated beliefs on S.
event that fl yields zk . Intuitively, ∆ is a copy of any one of the act events Al (zj ) in S,
except that fl yields zk (instead of zj ) in every state in ∆. By virtue of a tort litigation, the
parties learn that fl yields zk with probability δ > 0. By defintion, δ = pb(∆).
28

For example, we could have τ (xi ) = e−xi .
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For each state s ∈ ∆, let L(s) ≡ {t ∈ S : ti = si , ∀ i ̸= l} denote the event in S that
corresponds to the state s ∈ ∆. In other words, L(s) comprises the states in S in which
every activity (other than fl ) yields the same consequence that it yields in state s ∈ ∆.
By Reverse Bayesianism, the relative likelihoods of the states in S are preserved: p(s)/p(t) =
pb(s)/b
p(t) for all s, t ∈ S. By Act Independence, the probability of each state in Sb equals the
b pb(s) = Qm pb (Ai (si )) for all
product of the probabilities of its constituent act events in S:
i=1
P

n
1
m
−1
b
b
b
s = (s , . . . , s ) ∈ S. Given S and pb, the efficient levels of care are x
ei = ξ
bij zj ,
j=1 π
P
i = 1, . . . , m, where π
bij =
pb(s). It follows that:
b i =zj
s∈S:s

Proposition 6.1 Assume Reverse Bayesianism and Act Independence. If the parties discover a new link from fl to zk , then:
(a) pb(s) = (1 − δ)p(s) for all s ∈ S.
(b) pb(s) = δp (L(s)) for all s ∈ ∆.

P
n
b
(1
−
δ)π
z
+
δz
(c) x
el = ξ −1
lj j
k .
j=1
b
(d) x
ei = x
ei for all i ̸= l.
Because activity fl is newly linked to harm zk , the due care standard for fl changes. If
zk is less than the activity’s prior expected harm, the standard is reduced. Otherwise it is
increased. The standard is unchanged only in the knife-edge case where the newly-linked
harm exactly equals the activity’s prior expected harm. This is stated formally below.
b
b
Corollary 6.1 The due care standard x
el increases (resp. decreases)—i.e., x
el > x
el (resp.
P
P
n
n
b
πlj zj , (resp. zk <
πlj zj ).
x
el < x
el )—if and only if zk >
j=1

j=1

b
bl = x
Under negligence, the court stipulates x
el as the new due care standard for fl and
bl > xl . This, along with the victim’s claim,
holds the injurer liable to pay damages of zk if x
bl .29
makes outsiders aware that fl can yield zk . Moreover, they can deduce δ from x
Pn
′ b
bl )+
c′ (x
j=1 πlj zj τ (xl )
Proposition 6.2 In the case of a new link from fl to zk , δ = Pn
.
′ b
′ b
j=1 πlj zj τ (xl )−zk τ (xl )

29

bl /zk in
The formula in Proposition 6.2 is not necessarily as complex as it seems. For instance, δ = 2x
the example from Section 5.1.
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P
As a result, outsiders can learn pb and b
hl (xl ) = nj=1 [(1 − δ)πij zj + δzk ] τ (xl ). This is the
information that other injurers need to take efficient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of zk . This
makes outsiders aware that fl can yield zk , but they cannot deduce δ or learn pb or b
hl (xl ).
Strict liability does not reveal sufficient information for other injurers to take efficient care.

6.2

New Act

Assume S ⊆ Z F . Suppose the parties discover a new activity, fm+1 . Again, let Sb denote
b Observe
the expanded feasible state space and pb denote the parties’ updated beliefs on S.
S
that Sb = nj=1 ∆j , where ∆j = Am+1 (zj ) is the newly discovered event that fm+1 yields zj .
Intuitively, each ∆j is an augmented copy of S in which fm+1 yields zj in every state. By
virtue of a tort litigation, the parties learn that fm+1 yields zj with probability δj > 0 for
P
all j = 1, . . . , n.30 Note that δj = pb(∆j ) and nj=1 δj = 1.
For each state s ∈ S, let E(s) ≡ {t ∈ Sb : ti = si , ∀ i ̸= m + 1} denote the event in
Sb that corresponds to the state s ∈ S. In other words, E(s) comprises the states in Sb in
which every act (other than fm+1 ) yields the same consequence that it yields in state s ∈ S.
S
Observe that Sb = s∈S E(s), where E(s) comprises n states, one in which fm+1 yields z1 ,
one in which fm+1 yields z2 , and so forth. Index the states in each E(s) by j = 1, . . . , n,
such that sj ∈ E(s) is the state in E(s) in which fm+1 yields zj . The connection between
b is that
the sets of events {E(s) : s ∈ S} and {∆j : j = 1, . . . , n}, both of which partition S,
∆j collects the jth state from each E(s).
By Reverse Bayesianism, p(s)/p(t) = pb(E(s))/b
p(E(t)) for all s, t ∈ S. By Act IndepenQm+1
b Given Sb and pb, the efficient
dence, pb(s) = i=1 pb (Ai (si )) for all s = (s1 , . . . , sm+1 ) ∈ S.
P

P
n
b
pb(s). It follows that:
levels of care are x
ei = ξ −1
bij zj , i = 1, . . . , m + 1, π
bij =
j=1 π
b i =zj
s∈S:s

Proposition 6.3 Assume Act Independence and Reverse Bayesianism. If the parties discover a new act fm+1 , then:
b pb(sj ) = δj p(s) ∀ sj ∈ E(s), j = 1, . . . , n.
(a) For all s ∈ S and corresponding E(s) ⊂ S,
b
(b) x
ei = x
ei for all i ̸= m + 1.
P

n
b
(c) x
em+1 = ξ −1
δ
z
j=1 j j .
30

Assuming δj > 0 for all j is without loss of generality. We can deal with the case where δj = 0 for some
j by assuming δj > 0 for the first k < n and changing n to k as necessary in the statements below.
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b
bm+1 = x
Under negligence, the court stipulates x
em+1 as the due care standard for the
new activity fm+1 and holds the injurer liable. (The due care standards for f1 , . . . , fm are
unchanged.) This makes outsiders aware of fm+1 (and that it is risky). Although they cannot
bm+1 , they nevertheless can infer b
bm+1 .31
separately deduce each δj from x
hm+1 (xm+1 ) from x
′ b
Proposition 6.4 In the case of a new act fm+1 , b
hm+1 (xm+1 ) = − τc ′((xxbm+1 )) τ (xm+1 ).
m+1

Thus, negligence reveals sufficient information for others to take efficient care. Under strict
liability, by contrast, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages to the victim.
This makes outsiders aware of fm+1 (and that it is risky), but they do not learn b
hm+1 (xm+1 ).
Again, strict liability does not reveal enough information to induce efficient care.

6.3

New Consequence

Assume S ⊆ Z F . Suppose the parties discover a new consequence, zn+1 . Once again, let
b
Sb denote the expanded feasible state space and pb denote the parties’ updated beliefs on S.
S
Observe that Sb = S ∪ ∆, where ∆ = m Ai (zn+1 ) is the union of the newly discovered
i=1

events that fi yields zn+1 for all i = 1, . . . , m. By virtue of a tort litigation, the parties learn
that fi yields zn+1 with probability αi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , m.32 That is, αi = pb(Ai (zn+1 )).
Let δ = pb(∆).
For each state s ∈ ∆, let I(s) ≡ {i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : si = zn+1 } denote the indices of the
acts that yield zn+1 in that state of the world, and let I(s) ≡ {i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : si ̸= zn+1 }
denote the indices of the acts that do not yield zn+1 in that state of the world. In addition,
for each s ∈ ∆, let C(s) ≡ {t ∈ S : ti = si , ∀ i ∈ I(s)} denote the event in S that corresponds
to s ∈ ∆ on I(s). In other words, C(s) comprises the states in S in which every act (other
than the acts that yield zn+1 ) yields the same consequence that it yields in state s ∈ ∆.
By Reverse Bayesianism, p(s)/p(t) = pb(s)/b
p(t) for all s, t ∈ S. By Act Independence,
Qm
b In particular, the probability of the event
pb(s) = i=1 pb (Ai (si )) for all s = (s1 , . . . , sm ) ∈ S.
Q
that no activity yields zn+1 is 1 − δ = m
i=1 (1 − αi ). It follows that:
Proposition 6.5 Assume Reverse Bayesianism and Act Independence. If the parties discover a new consequence zn+1 , then:
31

Note, however, that if each zj is a different type of harm that requires a different type of care, then the
bm+1,j with respect to each zj , in which case outsiders
court would stipulate a different due care standard x
could separately deduce each δj .
32
Assuming αi > 0 for all i is without loss of generality. We can deal with the case where αi = 0 for some
i by assuming αi > 0 for the first l < m and changing m to l as necessary in the statements below.
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Q
(a) pb(s) = ( m
i=1 (1 − αi )) p(s) = (1 − δ)p(s) for all s ∈ S.
Q
 Q

(b) pb(s) =
α
(1
−
α
)
p (C(s)) for all s ∈ ∆ such that I(s) ⊂ {1, . . . , m}.
i
i∈I(s) i
i∈I(s)
(c) pb(s) =

Qm

i=1 αi

for the s ∈ ∆ such that I(s) = {1, . . . , m}.

Part (a) is dictated by Reverse Bayesianism. The relative likelihoods of the states in S
are preserved. Parts (b) and (c) are dictated by Act Independence. Part (c) is a direct
Q
implication. The probability of the state in which activity yields zn+1 is m
i=1 αi . Part (b)
says that the probabilities of the other states in Sb are proportionate to the probabilities of
their corresponding events in S.
P

n+1
b
π
b
z
Given Sb and pb, the efficient levels of care are x
ei = ξ −1
j=1 ij j , i = 1, . . . , m, where
P
pb(s). Specifically:
π
bij =
b i =zj
s∈S:s

Proposition 6.6 Assume Reverse Bayesianism and Act Independence. If the parties dis
P
n
b
(1 − αi )πij zj + αi zn+1 , i = 1, . . . , m.
cover a new consequence zn+1 , then x
ei = ξ −1
j=1

It follows that the due care standard for activity fi , i = 1, . . . , m, is unchanged after the
discovery of zn+1 if and only if zn+1 equals the activity’s prior expected harm.
b
Corollary 6.2 The due care standard x
ei , i = 1, . . . , m, increases (resp. decreases)—i.e.,
P
P
b
b
x
ei > x
ei (resp. x
ei < x
ei )—if and only if zn+1 > nj=1 πij zj , (resp. zn+1 < nj=1 πij zj ).
Thus, the discovery of zn+1 necessitates the stipulation of new due care standards for each
P
activity fi such that zn+1 ̸= nj=1 πij zj .
b
bi = x
ei , i = 1, . . . , m, as the new due care stanUnder negligence, the court stipulates x
dards for f1 , . . . , fm and holds the injurer liable to pay damages of zn+1 to the victim with
bi > xi . This, along with the victim’s claims, makes
respect to each activity fi such that x
outsiders aware of zn+1 (and that it is linked to f1 , . . . , fm ). Moreover, they can deduce
b1 , . . . , x
bm .
α1 , . . . , αm from x
Pn
′ b
bi )+
c′ (x
j=1 πij zj τ (xi )
Proposition 6.7 In the case of a new consequence zn+1 , αi = Pn
′ b
′ b
j=1 πij zj τ (xi )−zn+1 τ (xi )

for all i = 1, . . . , m.
As a result, outsiders can learn pb and b
h1 (x1 ), . . . , b
hm (xm ). This is sufficient information for
other injurers to take efficient care.
As before, strict liability reveals too little information. It makes outsiders aware of zn+1
(and that it is linked to f1 , . . . , fm ), but they cannot deduce α1 , . . . , αm , and hence cannot
learn pb and b
h1 (x1 ), . . . , b
hm (xm ).
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7

Related Literature and Our Contributions

To our knowledge, this paper is the first to incorporate unawareness into the economic
analysis of tort law. As such, we contribute to the tort law and economics literature and to
the unawareness literature, both of which are too vast to review here.33
A handful of papers apply unawareness models to study other legal topics. The bulk
of these focus on contracts. For example, Board and Chung (2011) argue that asymmetric
unawareness provides a justification for the contra proferentem doctrine of contract interpretation, which provides that ambiguous terms in a contract should be construed against
the drafter; Zhao (2011) argues that unawareness may explain the existence of force majeure
clauses in contracts; Grant et al. (2012) study aspects of differential awareness that give rise
to contractual disputes; Filiz-Ozbay (2012) posits asymmetric awareness as a reason for the
incompleteness of contracts; von Thadden and Zhao (2012, 2014) study the properties of
optimal contracts under moral hazard when the agent may be partially unaware of her action space; and Auster (2013) introduces asymmetric unawareness into the canonical moral
hazard model and analyzes the properties of the optimal contract.
Within the law and economics literature, the papers closest to ours include Teitelbaum
(2007), Chakravarty and Kelsey (2017), and Franzoni (2017), which explore the implications
of ambiguity for tort law.34 Although ambiguity and unawareness are distinct phenomena,
both are types of uncertainty that the standard accident model does not admit. Hence,
we share a common enterprise with the papers on tort law and ambiguity. We enrich the
standard accident model to allow the parties to face not just risk but rather a more profound
and realistic type of uncertainty, and we explore the implications of such uncertainty for the
debate over tort liability rules.
33

The tort law and economics literature was pioneered by Brown (1973). Other early contributions
include Diamond (1974a,b), Green (1976), and Shavell (1980). Surveys of this literature include Shavell
(2007), Schäfer and Müller-Langer (2009), and more recently Arlen (2017). The unawareness literature was
pioneered by Fagin and Halpern (1988). Other early contributions include Modica and Rustichini (1994,
1999), Dekel et al. (1998), Halpern (2001), Heifetz et al. (2006), and Halpern and Rêgo (2008). Surveys
of this literature include Schipper (2014) (which offers a “gentle introduction”) and Schipper (2015) (which
provides an extended review). Karni and Vierø (2013) were among the first to use the choice-theoretic
approach (i.e., the state-space approach) to modeling unawareness. Karni and Vierø (2013, 2017) and
Dominiak and Tserenjigmid (2022) survey the papers that take this approach.
34
Also related are the papers that explore the implications of risk aversion for tort law. In the seminal
paper on the topic, Shavell (1982) shows that strict liability is superior when the injurer is risk neutral and
the victim is risk averse, while negligence is superior in the opposite case. Franzoni (2017, n. 10) reviews
other papers on optimal tort liability rules under risk aversion and related contributions.
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We also share connections with Currie and MacLeod (2014), who develop an alternative to
the standard accident model that makes use of state-space representations, dubbed “Savage
Tables,” to model the decision problems faced by an injurer (who is fully aware of the state
space) under different liability rules. They apply their model to argue, inter alia, that
negligence provides better incentives than strict liability in the case of the Good Samaritan.
Ott and Schäfer (1997) study how the due care standard in negligence develops when the
court starts with no information about the efficient level of care and relies on information
provided by the parties in litigation. In their model, an efficient standard evolves over time as
a result of a learning process based on the information acquired by the court from litigants.
In a similar vein, Feess and Wohlschlegel (2006) compare negligence and strict liability when
some injurers have better information than others and the court about the efficient level of
care and the court does not know which injurers are informed and uninformed. They show
that, under certain conditions, the court can learn the efficient level of care by imperfectly
observing the injurer’s level of care in a large number of cases, and that under negligence
(but not strict liability) the uninformed injurers can in turn learn the efficient level of care
by observing the court’s due care standard.
Like Ott and Schäfer (1997) we study the evolution of the negligence due care standard in
response to knowledge generated by litigants, and like Feess and Wohlschlegel (2006) we argue
that negligence has an advantage over strict liability in terms of knowledge transmission. Our
motivation and analysis fundamentally differ from theirs, however, as we consider a world
with symmetric unawareness whereas they consider a (fully aware) world with asymmetric
information. Moreover, we explicitly model the process of belief revision in the wake of
growing awareness and of knowledge transmission through the due care standard. In contrast,
Ott and Schäfer (1997) derive transition probabilities from one standard to another and Feess
and Wohlschlegel (2006) derive steady-state beliefs in a rational expectations equilibrium.
We also contribute to the relatively nascent but rapidly growing behavioral law and
economics literature. Sunstein (1997), Jolls et al. (1998), and Korobkin and Ulen (2000) were
early calls for the modification of standard law and economics models to reflect advances in
behavioral economics and decision theory. Sunstein (2000) and Parisi and Smith (2005) are
edited volumes that collect early papers in the literature. Zamir and Teichman (2014) and
Teitelbaum and Zeiler (2018) are more recent volumes. Halbersberg and Guttel (2014) and
Luppi and Parisi (2018) provide surveys of behavioral models of tort law.
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8

Discussion

This paper extends the economic analysis of tort law to incorporate unawareness. We compare and contrast negligence and strict liability in a unilateral accident model with unawareness and growing awareness, and find that negligence has a key advantage—the due care
standard serves as a knowledge transmission mechanism. Under either tort liability rule, a
suit involving a newly discovered act, consequence, or link makes the world aware of a new
possibility of harm. But only negligence, through the stipulation of new due care standards,
spreads awareness about the updated probability of harm.35
The negligence due care standard is like a public good. The social benefit of spreading
awareness about the updated probability of harm is that potential injurers and victims
need not expend additional resources to develop this knowledge. This wastefully duplicative
effort would be necessary to achieve optimal deterrence under strict liability. In a sense,
negligence is akin to patents; both carry social costs (negligence is more costly to administer;
patents create monopolies and deadweight loss), yet both provide social benefits in terms
of knowledge transmission. One should bear in mind, however, that we do not purport to
undertake a full welfare analysis. We do not claim that negligence is superior to strict liability
in all circumstances. Rather, we claim that negligence is more robust to unawareness.
To model unawareness and growing awareness, we adopt the Reverse Bayesian approach
of Karni and Vierø (2013). This model has (at least) two attractive features. The first is
transparency. Karni and Vierø (2013) provide an axiomatic foundation for the model, and
so one can judge the theory by the axioms.36 The second is its accessibility. The model is
built upon a familiar choice-theoretic framework (expected utility theory), and the upshot is
a belief revision theory that mirrors the process of Bayesian updating. Becker et al. (2022)
present experimental evidence in support of Reverse Bayesianism.
At the same time, the Reverse Bayesian model has its shortcomings. For instance, Chambers and Hayashi (2018) criticize its empirical content from a revealed preference perspective.
They show that, in the case of a new consequence, the model does not make singular predictions about observable choices over feasible acts. A second shortcoming of the model is
35
Our argument can be extended to bilateral accidents. In this case, it would suggest that negligence with
a defense of contributory negligence (which is efficient as long as both due care standards are set correctly)
is superior to simple negligence (and to strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence) because the
court sets due care standards for both agents and as a result more information is released.
36
The key axioms of the model are the “consistency” axioms, which essentially require that preferences
conditional on the original state of awareness are not altered by growing awareness.
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that it assumes a naive or myopic unawareness—people are unaware that they are unaware.
A sophisticated unawareness, where people are aware that they are unaware, may be more
realistic. In response, Karni and Vierø (2017) extend their model to the case of sophisticated unawareness. The end result is a generalization that maintains the flavor of Reverse
Bayesianism and nests the naive model as a special case.
The pros and cons of the model aside, one might question the importance of our results
in a world with safety regulation in addition to tort liability. In such a world, one could
argue, there are regulators and other non-court actors who can spread awareness about
newly discovered risks. While this may be correct, it is orthogonal to our inquiry. We are
contributing to the negligence versus strict liability debate. We therefore consider a world
where the tort system is the only mechanism for regulating risky activities, and we compare
and contrast the two primary tort liability rules. If one were to consider a world with safety
regulation in addition to tort law, one would have to take into account the liability versus
regulation debate (e.g., Shavell, 1984a,b; Posner, 2010), and conclude that regulation is the
more efficient method of social control, before one could assert that the possibility of safety
regulation renders moot the debate over tort liability rules.
The importance of unawareness and growing awareness—via technological progress, scientific discovery, or otherwise—plainly extends beyond the case of unilateral accidents with
fixed activity levels. Natural extensions of this paper, therefore, would entail introducing
unawareness into other accident settings. In addition, future research could examine the
implications of unawareness for the economic analysis of other areas of law such as contract
remedies and criminal law or other topics such as litigation and settlement.

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5.1 By Reverse Bayesianism, the definition of δ, and pb1 + pb2 +
pb3 + pb4 = 1, we have pb2 =
second, we have pb1 +

p2
pb
p1 1

p2
pb
p1 1

and pb1 + pb2 = 1 − δ. Substituting the first equation into the

= 1 − δ, which implies
pb1 =

(1 − δ)p1
= (1 − δ)p1 ,
p1 + p2

where the last equality follows from p1 + p2 = 1. It follows that
pb2 =

p2
(1 − δ)p1 = (1 − δ)p2 .
p1
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By Act Independence and the definition of δ, we have pb3 = δ(b
p1 + pb3 ) and pb4 = δ(b
p2 + pb4 ),
which imply pb3 =

δ
pb
1−δ 1

pb3 =

δ
pb .
1−δ 2

and pb4 =

It follows that

δ
(1 − δ)p1 = δp1
1−δ

and pb4 =

δ
(1 − δ)p2 = δp2 .
1−δ

Proof of Proposition 5.2 Reverse Bayesianism implies the following conditions:
p2 (b
p1 + pb5 ) = p1 (b
p2 + pb6 ),

p3 (b
p1 + pb5 ) = p1 (b
p3 + pb7 ),

and p4 (b
p1 + pb5 ) = p1 (b
p4 + pb8 ).

Summing the left- and right-hand sides, and adding p1 (b
p1 + pb5 ) to each side, yields
(p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 )(b
p1 + pb5 ) = (b
p1 + · · · + pb8 )p1 .
Because p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1 and pb1 + · · · + pb8 = 1, we have pb1 + pb5 = p1 . Substituting this
back into the Reverse Bayesian conditions yields
pb1 + pb5 = p1 ,

pb2 + pb6 = p2 ,

pb3 + pb7 = p3 ,

and pb4 + pb8 = p4 .

By Act Independence and the definition of δ, we have
pb5 = (b
p1 + pb5 )δ,

pb6 = (b
p2 + pb6 )δ,

pb7 = (b
p3 + pb7 )δ,

and pb8 = (b
p4 + pb8 )δ.

These imply
pb5 =

δ
pb1 ,
1−δ

δ
pb2 ,
1−δ

pb7 =

δ
pb3 ,
1−δ

δ
pb2 = p2 ,
1−δ

pb3 +

δ
pb3 = p3 ,
1−δ

pb6 =

and pb8 =

δ
pb4 .
1−δ

It follows that
pb1 +

δ
pb1 = p1 ,
1−δ

pb2 +

and pb4 +

δ
pb4 = p4 .
1−δ

These imply pb1 = (1 − δ)p1 , pb2 = (1 − δ)p2 , pb3 = (1 − δ)p3 , and pb4 = (1 − δ)p4 , which in turn
imply pb5 = δp1 , pb6 = δp2 , pb7 = δp3 , and pb8 = δp4 .
Proof of Proposition 5.3 Reverse Bayesianism implies the following conditions:
p2 pb1 = p1 pb2 ,

p3 pb1 = p1 pb3 ,
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and p4 pb1 = p1 pb4 .

Summing the left- and right-hand sides, and adding p1 pb1 to each side, yields
(p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 )b
p1 = (b
p1 + pb2 + pb3 + pb4 )p1 ,
which implies pb1 = (1 − δ)p1 .37 Substituting this back in the Reverse Bayesian conditions
yields pb2 = (1 − δ)p2 , pb3 = (1 − δ)p3 , and pb4 = (1 − δ)p4 .
By Act Independence, pb5 = (b
p5 + pb6 + pb9 )(b
p1 + pb3 + pb5 ) = α1 (b
p1 + pb3 + pb5 ). Hence,
(1 − α1 ) pb5 = α1 (b
p1 + pb3 ) = α1 (1 − δ) (p1 + p3 ),
which implies pb5 = α1 (1 − α2 ) (p1 + p3 ) (using 1 − δ = (1 − α1 ) (1 − α2 )). By similar
reasoning, pb6 = α1 (1 − α2 )(p2 + p4 ), pb7 = (1 − α1 )α2 (p1 + p2 ), and pb8 = (1 − α1 )α2 (p3 + p4 ).
Finally, s9 is the event that both acts yield the new consequence. By Act Independence its
probability equals the product of the probabilities of its constituent act events: pb9 = α1 α2 .
Proof of Proposition 6.1 Parts (a) and (b) follow from Theorem 1 of Chakravarty et al.
(2022).
(c) Observe that

Pn

blj zj
j=1 π

j̸=k

π
blj zj =

P

blj zj
j̸=k π

#

"
P

=

P

P

j̸=k

b l =zj
s∈S:s

+ δzk . By parts (a) and (b),
#

"

pb(s) zj =

P

P

j̸=k

s∈S:sl =zj

P

(1 − δ)p(s) +

δp (L(s)) zj .

s∈∆:sl =zj

Observe that sl = zk for all s ∈ ∆. It follows that, for all j ̸= k,

P

δp (L(s)) = 0. Thus,

s∈∆:sl =zj

#

"
P
j̸=k

π
blj zj =

P

P

j̸=k

s∈S:sl =zj

(1 − δ)p(s) zj =

P

(1 − δ)πlj zj =

j̸=k

where the last equality follows from πlk = 0. Hence,

Pn

blj zj
j=1 π

=

Pn

− δ)πlj zj ,

Pn

− δ)πlj zj + δzk .

j=1 (1

j=1 (1

(d) Take any i ̸= l and any j. By parts (a) and (b),
π
bij =

P
b i =zj
s∈S:s

pb(s) =

P

(1 − δ)p(s) +

s∈S:si =zj

P

δp (L(s)) .

s∈∆:si =zj

Observe that L(s) is the union of all t ∈ S such that ti = si for all i ̸= l. Thus,
P

p (L(s)) =

s∈∆:si =zj
37

P

p (t) .

t∈S:ti =zj

Note that p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1 and pb1 + pb2 + pb3 + pb4 = 1 − δ.
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Hence,
π
bij =

P

P

(1 − δ)p(s) +

s∈S:si =zj

P

δp (s) =

s∈S:si =zj

p(s) = πij .

s∈S:si =zj

b
It follows that x
ei = x
ei for all i ̸= l.
P
b
Proof of Corollary 6.1 By Proposition 6.1, ξ(x
el ) = nj=1 (1 − δ)πlj zj + δzk . Observe
P
P
b
that ξ(e
xl ) = nj=1 πlj zj . It follows that ξ(x
el ) > ξ(e
xl ) if and only if zk > nj=1 πlj zj . Because
Pn
b
ξ ′ (xi ) > 0 for all xi , we have x
el = x
el if and only if zk =
j=1 πlj zj . The case where
Pn
zk < j=1 πlj zj is similar.
b
bl ) =
bl = x
el , we have ξ(x
Proof of Proposition 6.2 By Proposition 6.1 and x
Pn
j=1 (1 − δ)πlj zj + δzk . It follows that
P
bl ) − nj=1 πlj zj
ξ(x
P
.
δ=
zk − nj=1 πlj zj
bl ) = −c′ (x
bl )/τ ′ (x
bl ). Thus,
Observe that ξ(x
P
bl )
bl ) + nj=1 πlj zj τ ′ (x
c′ (x
δ = Pn
.
′ b
′ b
j=1 πlj zj τ (xl ) − zk τ (xl )
Proof of Proposition 6.3 Part (a) follows from Theorem 2 of Chakravarty et al. (2022).
b Take any i ̸= m + 1 and any j. By
(b) Recall that {E(s) : s ∈ S} forms a partition of S.
part (a),
#

"
π
bij =

P
b i =zj
s∈S:s

Note that

Pn

pb(s) =

l=1 δl

P

P

s∈S:si =zj

sl ∈E(s)



pb(sl ) =

= 1. Thus, π
bij =

P
s∈S:si =zj



P

n
P

s∈S:si =zj

l=1

δl p(s) =


P

p(s)

s∈S:si =zj

n
P


δl .

l=1

b
p(s) = πij . It follows that x
ei = x
ei for all

i ̸= m + 1.
P

n
b
(c) By definition, π
bm+1,j = δj for all j = 1, . . . , n. Hence, x
em+1 = ξ −1
δ
z
.
j
j
j=1
P
bm+1 =
Proof of Proposition 6.4 Observe that b
hm+1 (xm+1 ) = nj=1 π
bm+1,j zj τ (xm+1 ) and x
P

P
n
b
bm+1 ) = nj=1 π
x
em+1 = ξ −1
bm+1,j zj . The latter implies ξ(x
bm+1,j zj . Thus, b
hm+1 (xm+1 ) =
j=1 π
′

bm+1 )τ (xm+1 ). Recall that ξ(xi ) ≡ −c′ (xi )/τ ′ (xi ). Hence, b
ξ(x
hm+1 (xm+1 ) = − τc ′((xxbm+1 )) τ (xm+1 ).
b

m+1
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Proof of Proposition 6.5 This proposition follows from Theorem 3 of Chakravarty et al.
(2022).
Proof of Proposition 6.6 Take any i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Observe that
P

P

n+1
n
−1
b
x
ei = ξ −1
π
b
z
=
ξ
π
b
z
+
α
z
.
ij
j
ij
j
i
n+1
j=1
j=1
Let Γ(αl , s) ≡

Q

π
bij =

l∈I(s) αl

P
b i =zj
s∈S:s

 Q

pb(s) =

(A.1)


(1
−
α
)
for all s ∈ ∆. By Proposition 6.5,
l
l∈I(s)
Qm

P
s∈S:si =zj

l=1 (1

− αl )p(s) +

Qm

− αl )

P

Γ(αl , s)p(C(s)),

s∈∆:si =zj

for all j ̸= n + 1. Observe that
P
s∈S:si =zj

Qm

l=1 (1

− αl )p(s) =

l=1 (1

P

p(s) = (1 − δ)πij

s∈S:si =zj

and that
P

Γ(αl , s)p(C(s)) =

s∈∆:si =zj

Q

P
s∈∆:si =zj

l∈I(s) αl

Q
=

P
s∈∆:si =zj

Q

l∈I(s) αl

l∈I(s) (1

where the last equality follows because 1 − δ =

 Q

Qn

− αl )

i=1 (1


(1
−
α
)
p(C(s))
l
l∈I(s)

(1 − δ)p(C(s)),

− αi ). Hence,

Q
1
−
α
l
l̸=i (1 − αl )
Q l∈I
Γ(αl , s)p(C(s)) =
(1 − δ)πij = Q
(1 − δ)πij .
I⊂{{1,...,m}\{i}}
s∈∆:si =zj
l∈I (1 − αl )
l̸=i (1 − αl )
Q

P

P

Thus,
Q
1 − l̸=i (1 − αl )
π
bij = (1 − δ)πij + Q
(1 − δ)πij
l̸=i (1 − αl )
!


1
1 − αi
= (1 − δ)πij
= (1 − αi )πij .
= (1 − δ)πij Q
1−δ
l̸=i (1 − αl )

(A.2)

P

n
−1
b
Substituting (A.2) back into (A.1), we have x
ei = ξ
j=1 (1 − αi )πij zj + αi zn+1 .
b
Proof of Corollary 6.2 Take any i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. By Proposition 6.6, we have ξ(x
ei ) =
Pn
Pn
b
xi ) = j=1 πij zj . It follows that ξ(x
ei ) > ξ(e
xi ) if
j=1 (1 − αi )πij zj + αi zn+1 . Observe that ξ(e
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P
b
and only if zn+1 > nj=1 πij zj . Because ξ ′ (xi ) > 0 for all xi , we have x
ei = x
ei if and only if
Pn
Pn
zn+1 = j=1 πij zj . The case where zn+1 < j=1 πij zj is similar.
b
bi = x
Proof
By Proposition 6.6, x
ei =
Pof Proposition 6.7 Take
 any i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. P
n
n
−1
b
ξ
j=1 (1 − αi )πij zj + αi zn+1 . It
j=1 (1 − αi )πij zj + αi zn+1 , which implies ξ(xi ) =
follows that

P
bi ) − nj=1 πij zj
ξ(x
P
αi =
.
zn+1 − nj=1 πij zj

bi ) = −c′ (x
bi )/τ ′ (x
bi ). Thus,
Observe that ξ(x
P
bi )
bi ) + nj=1 πij zj τ ′ (x
c′ ( x
.
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′ (x
′ (x
b
b
)
−
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)
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